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The paper explores examples of contemporary experience in order to 
demonstrate the moralisation of new areas of behaviour (especially in relation to 
environmental issues). It sketches a Foucauldian framework for understanding 
the historical transformation of experience, in terms of the “apparatus of 
experience”. On that basis, it presents a novel account of critique, in which 
critique is seen as the potentially transformational, experiential practice of re-
experiencing the contemporary apparatuses of experience. In other words, 
critique is “experience squared”. It is this re-experiencing of our everyday 
experience that permits us, to a certain extent, to “get over ourselves” and thus 
to reflect critically on the processes of moralisation and de-moralisation in which 
we participate.  
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“What would critique do if it could be associated with more, not with less, with 
multiplication, not subtraction”.  
(Latour, 2004: 248)  
 
“The analysis of descent permits the dissociation of the self and the proliferation 
of a thousand lost events on the site of its empty synthesis”.  
(Foucault, 1984a: 81 [1994a: 141, trans modified]) 
 
 
 
1 Transforming Moral Sensibilities 
 
Imagine you are sitting at a street side café. At a nearby table, three 
women and a young boy have just finished lunch and two of the women light up 
cigarettes. Let’s suppose you are not a smoker and you begin to feel annoyed 
by the smoke that wafts over to your table. You assume the non-smoker is the 
mother of the boy and you wonder what she thinks of her friends’ behaviour. Is 
she also worrying about the effect of all that smoke on the young boy? You ask 
yourself how long will it be before your city’s smoking ban is extended to 
outdoor areas. Finally, the two smokers get up and leave the table and you 
breathe a sigh of relief, only to be dismayed when the third woman lights up. 
Then you notice she is pregnant.  
 
Second, imagine that you walk into your local supermarket to pick up 
some things on your way home from work. You get to the check-out and the 
cashier asks you if you need a plastic bag. You instantly realise you have left 
your re-usable shopping bag in the car and you hesitate for a second before 
accepting the bag, for which you pay a government levy. When you get home, 
	 3	
your partner looks askance at the plastic bag as you feebly try to justify your 
forgetfulness and you resolve, yet again, to do better the next time.  
 
 When considered together, these vignettes suggest that, at least in some 
areas of life, the last few decades have brought about fundamental shifts in our 
everyday experience. This observation is unlikely to come as a surprise to 
anybody. Nor are these particular shifts unique in recent history. After all, similar 
changes have occurred in many Western societies within even shorter 
timeframes, for example in the area of same-sex relations and gay marriage. 
But what, if any, is the significance of these changes for philosophy? Are 
historical changes in social attitudes relevant to the work being done in fields 
such as ethics? I want to suggest that these changes are indeed relevant, in 
two quite general ways. First, they offer a rich and complex set of phenomena 
against which we can test and hone a rigorous account of the historicity of 
ethical experience. Second, the framework that emerges from this analysis 
opens up new ways of thinking about the tasks of critique. If we can speak of 
transforming ethical sensibilities, therefore, it is not just a matter of describing 
how our experience undergoes transformation, as it were passively, it is also a 
matter of addressing the contemporary forces that may actively transform it – 
forces that include critique.  
 
 
2 The History of Experience 
 
In 1966, in The Order of Things, Foucault pointed out that “At any given 
instant, the structure proper to individual experience finds a certain number of 
possible choices (and of excluded possibilities) in the systems of the society; 
inversely, at each of their points of choice the social structures encounter a 
certain number of possible individuals (and others who are not)” (2002, 415). In 
other words, at each particular place and time there is a certain range of 
subjective experience that is made more or less likely by the social structures of 
that time. And, as the social structures change, so too does the range of 
possible human experience. What this gives rise to, as Ian Hacking has pointed 
out, is the possibility of studying the historical transformations that open up and 
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close off potential human experiences (2002, 23). But what does it mean to say 
that the range of possible human experience changes historically? Isn’t that just 
a trivial fact? To address this concern, let’s begin by distinguishing three senses 
in which human experience could be said to have a history.  
 
First, as an individual, there is the sequence of experiences that I have 
had – eating soft-serve ice cream as a child, learning to drive, getting a job, 
seeing Borobudur for the first time, and so on. And, collectively, there is the sum 
of all human experience. We could say that this form of historicity arises from 
the, at least theoretical, possibility that one could record the entirety of one's 
own experiences. Whether such a task is really possible, either for an individual 
or the species, is a question that we can leave to one side here. But, let’s call 
this the chronicler’s history of experience.  
 
Second, my experience has a history in so far as soft-serve ice cream no 
longer pleases me as much today as it did when I was a child. That childhood 
experience is now lost to me. And, if I ever see Borobudur again that 
experience will necessarily be different from – and coloured by – my first 
experience. Similarly, the thrill of ‘high-speed’ nineteenth century train travel is 
now lost to all of us. If we travel on a steam train today, it is likely to be at an 
‘olde worlde’ tourist attraction. Even the early-adopters' pleasure at swiping the 
touch screen of the first iPad in 2010 is something that has become dulled for 
users today. The historicity of experience, in this sense, arises from the 
cumulative and dynamic nature of experience – both for individuals and 
societies. Let’s call this the history of experience as bildung. 
 
My suggestion, which I will elaborate here, is that it also makes sense to 
talk about the history of experience in a third sense. This is history in a more 
profound sense – a historicity that arises from fundamental changes in the way 
we relate to ourselves, to others, and to the world. It corresponds to changes in 
what Foucault might have been willing to call the “historical a priori” of 
experience. Let's call this the history of the apparatus of experience, although 
Foucault in fact never used this term.  
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So, addressing the concern expressed above, we can say that while in 
one sense it is trivially true that experience has a history, it is also true that 
experience has a history in other, more significant, senses. It is true that the 
chronicler’s history of experience may be of little philosophical importance. The 
fact that, for example, at one time and place humans were introduced to the 
abundant uses of plastic, while at another time and place they carefully 
curtailed its use, doesn’t seem in itself to be all that interesting. The second 
sense in which experience can be said to have a history is, however, much 
more significant. Recognising the history of experience as bildung, the kind of 
history that Gadamer for example investigated (2003), is essential for 
understanding transformations in the way individuals (and groups) experience 
the world. The overlaying of experience in complex webs of mutual interference 
and influence is a basic feature of our being in the world. One of its most 
important implications is, as Gadamer says, that “Strictly speaking, we cannot 
have the same experience twice” (2003, 353). Further than this, however, the 
third sense in which experience can be said to have a history is of even more 
far-reaching significance. Put crudely, this is the idea that the field of possible 
experiences is not historically stable. There was a time in the past (and there 
will be a time in the future) when choosing a bag could not (and will not) be 
lived as a moral experience. And this is not merely because a historical 
succession of everyday objects appear in and disappear from the social world, 
nor is it because of an accumulated familiarity, or loss of familiarity, with these 
objects. Rather, my suggestion is that changes occur in the underlying 
apparatus of experience that render some experiences more likely, almost 
inevitable, while others are consigned to the limits of possibility. To begin to give 
an account of this apparatus, it will help to think of it as analogous to what 
Foucault variously calls an episteme, an historical a priori, and an apparatus. 
 
A quick characterisation of Foucault’s work from the 1960s would say 
that it began, in History of Madness (Foucault, 2006), with a form of analysis 
that combined, in a more or less confused way, all three of the later themes that 
were to occupy his work: knowledge, power, and self (O’Leary, 2010). In the 
course of the 1960s, the first of these themes was teased out and developed in 
a series of books that culminated in Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 
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1972). At the centre of this work was the idea that systems of knowledge are 
historically conditioned in ways that can be archeologically explored. To 
describe these systems, with their inherent limitations and possibilities, is to 
describe an episteme, or the historically contingent form of knowledge in a 
particular time and place. The episteme is the set of rules that govern what will 
be “in the true” in a given period; and the episteme is capable of undergoing 
quite radical and abrupt shifts, such as that which occurred at the beginning of 
the modern era. By the time he wrote Archaeology of Knowledge in 1969, 
Foucault had begun to speak of these conditions of knowledge as constituting 
an historical, as opposed to a formal, a priori. The historical a priori is the group 
of rules that characterise a particular discursive practice, that are purely 
contingent and subject to historical modification. Foucault doesn’t reject the 
idea of a formal a priori, however, he merely holds that these two exist on 
different levels, in “two different dimensions” (1972, 128).  
 
Subsequently, in 1977, at a time when Foucault’s work had already 
moved on to focus on power, he redefines the episteme in this way: 
 
I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic 
apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the 
statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within, I 
won’t say a scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, and which it is 
possible to say are true or false. (1980, 197) 
 
There is no doubt that this retrospective definition modifies the concept as 
it had appeared in the 1960s. But, if we are willing to allow Foucault a little 
bit of flexibility, or indeed his own bildung, then I think we can say that this 
re-definition captures something that was perhaps only latent in the 
concept as it first appeared. In any case, it is a redefinition that opens up 
some new possibilities.  
 
The episteme, then, can be re-defined as a strategic apparatus for 
separating scientific from non-scientific statements. And what is an 
“apparatus”? Well, at this period of Foucault’s work (mid-1970s), the term 
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apparatus (dispositif) is used to indicate a whole ensemble of elements 
that somehow, in more or less coordinated fashion, bring about certain 
discursive and socio-political effects. The elements that comprise the 
apparatus are a mixed bag of discourses, laws, architectural forms and 
philosophical theories; and the apparatus itself is a “system of relations” 
that is established between these elements (1997, 194). Hence, we could 
speak of an eighteenth century “apparatus of discipline” that comprised 
instruction manuals, medical knowledge, military institutions, parade 
grounds, weaponry, and so on.  
 
 My suggestion here is that this group of concepts – the episteme, 
the historical a priori, and the apparatus – can help us begin to think about 
the third sense in which I said experience has a history. What if it were 
possible to identify the historically contingent elements that define and 
structure the field of possible experience? If the episteme can be called 
the epistemological unconscious, the “positive unconscious of knowledge” 
(2002, xi), then can we also investigate the experiential unconscious? And, 
if Foucault, along with Bachelard, allows us to think about “epistemological 
ruptures”, can we also think about experiential ruptures? In what follows, I 
will suggest that it does make sense to speak in these terms, and that in 
turn will allow us to develop an account of what we can call deliberately 
induced experiential ruptures – that is, critically induced shifts in our 
ethical experience.  
 
 
3  The Apparatus of Experience 
 
 What are the components of the apparatus of experience? As we have 
seen, an apparatus can consist of a diverse and bewildering range of discursive 
and non-discursive elements. In thinking about the apparatus of experience, 
however, we can follow Foucault in grouping this multiplicity along three axes. 
These three groups are i) forms of knowledge, ii) forms of normativity, and iii) 
forms of relation to the self (2008, 5; 2011, 3). It is the “articulation” of these 
three elements that constitute what Foucault calls “foyers d’expérience” (2008, 
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5), noting that he himself had focused his work on several key foyers, such as 
madness, criminality, and sexuality. But, what is a foyer d’expérience? This 
phrase is translated by Graham Burchell as “focal point of experience” (2011, 3), 
reading foyer in the sense of the technical term from optics ‘focal point’, rather 
than in the more everyday sense of foyer as ‘source’ or ‘meeting place’. One 
advantage of this rendering is that it conveys the idea that our modern 
experience comes most sharply into focus in domains such as sexuality, 
madness, and so on. However, we should be careful not to miss what I take to 
be the important implication that experience arises out of the interplay between 
the three elements. It is not that experience is a pre-existing phenomenon or 
capacity that gets focused on something like madness or sexuality. Rather, our 
experience of “madness” or “sexuality” is itself first made possible by the 
articulation of these elements; in other words, it is made possible by this 
apparatus. This sense is captured in an alternative phrasing that Foucault uses 
on several occasions, when he speaks of these axes as constituting the “matrix 
of experience” (1997a, 204). It is the interplay between these elements that 
makes any experience possible.  
 
Now, since the components that make up each of the three axes are in a 
state of continuous historical transformation, it follows that the modes of 
experience that they make possible must also be in flux. And this occurs, not 
only at the level of what we can call historical time, but also at the micro-level of 
the life-span of an individual. While most, if not all, of these historical 
transformations occur, as it were, independently of conscious intentionality, and 
while they are usually, if not always, beyond the awareness of the individual, we 
will see that they can become susceptible to deliberate critical intervention.  
 
 Let’s see how this basic model works in relation to the first vignette I 
described above. Along the first axis (knowledge) the most obvious feature of 
this scenario is that whatever my response to this situation, whether I am a 
smoker or a non-smoker, much of my response will be coloured by commonly 
held knowledge about the negative effects of cigarette smoke. And this 
knowledge has a history, in the sense of both history of science and political 
history. This unremarkable, everyday experience is, therefore, quite precisely 
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dateable; it could not have happened in 1960 and may no longer be possible in 
2060. Along the second axis (normativity), the key determining element is the 
increasing regulation of smoking in public places, which is of course closely 
connected to the knowledge axis via the science of public health. The 
framework for this experience is, therefore, put in place by this form of 
regulation; but it is also coloured by my own views about the kinds of norms that 
should govern social interaction. Am I myself a smoker who believes smokers 
have a right to smoke in public, or do I believe that even apart from health 
concerns, this is a public nuisance that should be controlled? In any case, it is 
clear that whatever the particular nuances of my experience in this situation, 
elements of power, law, and regulation are key determining factors. And all of 
these factors are clearly historically variable. Along the third axis (forms of 
relation to the self, or ethics), my experience is shaped through the lens of both 
my modes of relation to self and my moral judgements about others. It is 
possible, for example, that I myself had overcome my own smoking habit in the 
past and now see the smokers’ behaviour as, in the broadest sense, a moral 
failing, perhaps of the akratic type. And, there is no doubt that the sight of a 
pregnant woman smoking will be experienced as both shocking and, to some 
extent, morally outrageous by many people today. 
 
 What the Foucauldian framework gives us, then, is a way of identifying 
the web of historically contingent factors that give shape to our everyday 
experience. There is, however, a question here about the extent to which these 
historically specific factors are determining. Is our experience determined ‘all 
the way down’ by such factors? Or, are there certain biological or natural limits 
to its historicity? What of the sheer olfactory experience of the cigarette smoke, 
for example? Surely that has no historical component. While I can’t do this topic 
justice here, I would suggest that it is more difficult than one might imagine to 
identify a pure, ahistorical experience (cf. Agamben 1993). For most intents and 
purposes, my own experience of the smell of cigarette smoke is, at the very 
least, subject to history in the bildung sense. My mother smoked when I was a 
child, I smoked as an adult, I no longer smoke now; so today, the smell of 
cigarette smoke is both irritating and, at times, pleasantly nostalgic. So, while I 
am capable of making what one might call a pure or neutral distinction between, 
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say, the smell of cigarette smoke and cigar smoke, it is also true that for most 
intents and purposes, it is the more nuanced and historically fluid experience 
that really matters to me.  
 
Further than this bildung sense of history, however, there is the really 
difficult question of whether the olfactory experience is also subject to history in 
the sense of the historical a priori. Is there something about the current anti-
smoking climate that primes us to experience cigarette smoke as more 
unpleasant than would otherwise be the case? Does the contemporary 
apparatus of experience make it more likely that I will experience the smell as 
unpleasant? One way to think about this interplay between history and the body 
would be to go back to the analogy I drew on earlier, between the idea of the 
history of experience and Foucault’s account of an historical a priori. I already 
noted that Foucault’s investigation of an historical a priori in no way implies that 
he rejects the notion of a formal a priori. Rather, he says that these belong to 
different dimensions – albeit, dimensions that do intersect. Foucault suggests 
that the empirically contingent historical a prioris allow us to account for the 
particular “points of contact, places of insertion, irruption, or emergence” of the 
formal a prioris (1972, 128). 
 
Extending the analogy, it might be possible to argue that the entire 
biological experiential infrastructure is like the formal a priori, while the historical 
a priori is the socially mediated apparatus of any historically contingent actual 
experience. So, at any given time, a particular historically contingent apparatus 
will facilitate, or awaken, certain possibilities in the sensorium, while others will 
remain dormant. This would explain why, for example, the smell of cigarette 
smoke can be pleasurable, irritating, nostalgic, seductive, or addictive for 
different people at different times. While much of this variation occurs at the 
level of individual bildung (that is, the life experience of the individual), the 
challenge would be to identify the shared elements, the components of the 
apparatus, that determine these possibilities in historically contingent ways.  
 
That is not my task here, but at least this sketch of an approach to the 
question shows how the concept of the apparatus of experience may point a 
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way towards answering it. Using the three axes of the apparatus of experience 
as an analytic grid, we can give an account of the historically determined 
elements of the most commonplace experiences. Even though the human 
sensorium, understood as a biological system, may be something of a limit-case 
for this account, the account does effectively open up much of our experience 
to a historical analysis. And this is particularly true for experiences which could 
be called ethical experiences, to which I will turn now. 
 
 
4 The History of Ethical Experience 
 
How do we isolate an experience that is, in some sense, ethical from any 
other sort of experience? One way to do so would be to identify those 
experiences in which the third element of the matrix of experience —  that is, 
the modes of subjectivity or the "pragmatics of self” (2011, 5) — are of prime 
significance. Let’s look more closely at the second vignette I described and see 
how Foucault’s framework can help us to pick out these ethical factors. Even at 
a first glance, it is clear how this experience is structured along the first and 
second axes. The whole scenario could not take place without a certain widely 
accepted (and denied) body of knowledge about climate change. As in the case 
of the smoking vignette, this knowledge has a history in both a history of 
science and a political sense. And, even when the basic facts about climate 
change have been accepted there can still be a debate about how effective are 
measures such as the targeting of plastic bags. Along the second axis, once 
again the scenario is only made possible by a regulatory regime that was 
introduced by government authorities with the cooperation of shops and the 
manufacturers of re-usable bags. As in the smoking vignette, if there were no 
such regulatory infrastructure, there would be no such experience to report.  
 
Along the third axis, however, things are quite different in the case of the 
plastic bag. Here, it is more than likely that you will experience this event as 
activating ethical self-understandings, principles, and ideals. In my imagined 
version, you acknowledge the eco-friendly principles involved and you want to 
enact them in your own activities, but you choose what might be seen as the 
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lazy option and then feel remorse when forced to acknowledge this to a 
significant other. This is not a matter of applying your pre-existing, more or less 
stable moral principles to a new phenomenon. The experience, as described, 
actually requires a shift in your understanding of yourself as a moral agent. It 
requires you to see yourself as, to some extent, responsible for the fate of the 
planet, and it requires you to enact this understanding when making choices 
that were not previously problematised for you. In this way, the simple fact of 
choosing a shopping bag becomes an ethical dilemma.  
 
In the Preface to The Order of Things, Foucault talks about his laughter 
when he read Borges’ account of a Chinese encyclopedia in which animals are 
categorized in incongruous and illogical ways. Foucault explains the 
significance of his laughter in this way: 
 
In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one 
great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as 
the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of our 
own, the stark impossibility of thinking that. (2002, xvi)  
 
How did it come about that the choice of a shopping bag could have that 
significance for so many people today? As I have suggested, the best way we 
can account for this strange novelty is by investigating the three-fold web of 
historically changing elements that give shape to the experience. In the most 
general terms, what we see happening here is the moralisation of a range of 
behaviour that was previously outside the moral domain. This process of 
moralisation is, of course, closely bound up with changes that occur along the 
knowledge and normativity axes. But, it is the changing forms of the “pragmatics 
of self”, along the third axis, that give this experience its novel character as an 
ethical experience. And, the advantage of the analysis offered here is that it 
allows us to identify the relatively fluid, historically variable elements that make 
an experience like that possible.  
 
Hence, I would suggest that this experience of buying the plastic bag is 
identifiable as ethical – not because it involves the practical application of 
	 13	
previously accepted moral principles – but because it activates a whole range of 
concerns about self-formation. These concerns are, as we have seen, activated 
within a broader framework that includes forms of knowledge about climate 
change, and also an emerging set of norms of behaviour that cajole us into 
“environmentally responsible” actions. But, it is the shifts at the level of the 
pragmatics of self that really make the experience possible as ethical. The act 
of buying the bag is not intrinsically moral in nature, therefore, it is simply that 
the articulation of the three elements, today, makes it more likely that the 
experience will crystallise, or come into focus, as having a strong moral 
component. It will, let us say, be more or less strongly infused with morality.  
 
But, of course, the boundaries between ethical and other experiences 
are neither clear-cut nor impermeable. For example, the encounter with the 
smokers at the cafe also carried an ethical component and in fact could be re-
described in such a way as to highlight those aspects. Nevertheless, I think it is 
useful to make a distinction and to treat a certain set of experiences as having 
important shared features of this kind, with the proviso that it is a somewhat 
artificial maneuver and that in any case there is no historically stable set of 
ethical experiences. Borrowing a phrase coined by Georges Canguilhem (1983, 
46), we can say that what is "in the true" today wasn't "in the true" yesterday, 
and probably will not be "in the true" tomorrow. All sorts of behaviours have 
undergone the process of moralisation and de-moralisation: behaviours ranging 
from marital infidelity and same sex relations, to the practice of selling human 
beings, eating factory-farmed meat, and using plastic bags. But, it is not only 
the content that changes; as we have seen, the form of moralisation also 
changes. Subject to those limitations, then, let’s say that the domain of ethical 
experience is the domain in which concerns and practices relating to self-self 
and self-other relations are activated in a way that is often filtered through 
concepts such as right and wrong, moral responsibility, and so on. The fact that 
there is a history of ethical experience in this sense implies that there is also a 
future of ethical experience. This is where the concept of critique becomes 
important. 
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5 The Critique of Ethical Experience 
 
What would it mean to engage in a critique of ethical experience, where 
ethical experience is understood according to this model? Foucault, of course, 
wrote some important texts on the nature of critique – most notably the 1978 
lecture “What is Critique?” (1997b) and the 1984 lecture “What is 
Enlightenment?” (1984b). However, rather than working through those sources 
here, I want to take a more simple route. Let’s start with a very straightforward 
account of critique, one that I extract from a comment Foucault made about his 
own work in a rather obscure interview from 1980:  
 
I try to analyze a real situation in its various complexities, with the 
goal of allowing refusal, and curiosity, and innovation. (1988, 13) 
 
Paraphrasing and extrapolating, we can say that critique is the production of a 
certain intellectual output that focuses on an aspect of one’s present reality; and 
this output allows others to engage in practices of refusal, curiosity, and 
innovation. Refusal, that is, of an aspect of one’s present reality; curiosity about 
how it came to be and how it is maintained; and innovation in our attempts to 
both think and live otherwise.  
 
 The emphasis in this succinct definition is a little different from what we 
see in the other sources. In the 1978 lecture, Foucault had described critique as 
something like a social movement that sprang up in opposition to the early 
modern development of new arts of government – in both the ecclesiastical and 
the political domains. In opposition to those new forms of governmentality, 
critique was “the art of not being governed quite so much” (1997b, 45). On this 
account, therefore, critique is the art of refusal that emerges in opposition to the 
increasing governmentalisation of Early Modern European society. In the 1984 
lecture, he associates the critical attitude with, once again, a characteristically 
modern approach to the limits of one’s current forms of life, but this time with a 
different set of cultural references. Critique – which has a complicated relation 
to both Enlightenment and the Baudelairian dandy – is an attitude that strives 
both to understand the limits that are imposed on us and to go beyond those 
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limits through practical experimentation (1984b, 50). I choose to prioritize the 
account given in the 1980 interview, however, because it compresses all of 
these ideas in a way that pithily brings out the relation between critique as 
transformative practice and critique as a mode of intellectual production.  
 
 As an intellectual activity, critique has a strong, indeed essential, 
historical component. However, the point of these historical investigations is not, 
Foucault remarks, to “satisfy professional historians”, but to use a particular 
historical content in order to: 
 
have for myself, and to invite others to share with me…an experience 
of what we are, not only our past but also our present, an experience 
of our modernity from which we might emerge transformed. (2000, 
242; translation modified, see 1994b, 44) 
 
The core idea here is that a certain historically grounded intellectual production 
can make a potentially transformative experience available to both researcher 
and reader. This effect is by no means automatic or guaranteed, however, 
because in order for it to actually occur, whether for researcher or reader, some 
kind of work on the self, some kind of risking of the self, will have to take place. 
Here is another comment Foucault makes about his own work that may help us 
to understand this requirement:  
 
The experience through which we manage to grasp the intelligibility 
of certain mechanisms (for example imprisonment, punishment, etc.) 
and the way in which we manage to detach ourselves from them 
[nous en détacher] by perceiving them otherwise, should be one and 
the same thing. This is really the heart of what I am doing. (2000, 
244; translation modified, see 1994b, 46) 
 
Now, paraphrasing this, we could say that the experience through which we 
come to understand certain apparatuses of experience is the same experience 
through which we come to transform those experiences by detaching ourselves 
from them. In other words, the process of re-experiencing our modes of 
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experience is the process through which we modify them, by in some way 
modifying ourselves. On this basis, we can say that critique makes available a 
de-automatising re-experiencing of our unthought experiences. I will call this 
experience squared, in the sense that it involves an experience of experience 
that multiplies the possibilities of experience through self-reflection. This is a 
fundamental element of critique — or, at least, a fundamental element of the 
critique of experience in the domain of ethics.  
 
In order to avert a possible misunderstanding here, I think it is important 
to emphasise that this work of transforming experience is not simply a matter of 
changing what is in our minds; it is not, for example, a matter of changing how 
we feel about things. Even if the ultimate outcome is that people do change 
what is ‘in their heads’, the point is that this can only be effectively brought 
about by changes at a different level. In thinking about transformations in 
experience, this would mean changes in relevant aspects of each of the three 
components of the matrix of experience. 
 
But, what is so special about ethical experiences? To be precise, why 
would they be a more intractable object of critique than any other domain of 
experience? Well, the problem is that to detach oneself from them requires, to a 
much greater degree, that one detach oneself from oneself. I have already 
suggested that ethical experiences are those in which our modes of relation to 
self are most implicated and activated. My decision to accept the plastic bag 
may be difficult, for me, because it conflicts with my understanding of myself as 
an enlightened, ecologically responsible member of an already fragile global 
eco-system. And this mode of relating to myself may be one that I have only 
arrived at after a prolonged process of adjustment. If, in contrast, I gladly 
choose the plastic bag, I may be doing so out of my own ethical certainty that 
climate change is a myth, that governments shouldn’t impose levies, and that 
individuals are best left to their own independent, self-maximising pursuits. In 
either case, the point is that gaining a critical distance vis-à-vis our ethical 
experiences is difficult precisely because it requires us to detach ourselves – or 
at least open ourselves to the possibility of detaching – from what may be our 
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most intimate and dearly held conceptions and practices of self. I want to turn 
now to a tentative account of what this critical work on the self might involve.  
 
 
6  Get Over Yourself 
 
We have already seen one occasion on which Foucault gives a central 
role to curiosity in the work of critique. In another context, he remarks that his 
own motivation for undertaking the two-volume history of ancient Greek and 
Roman sexuality and ethics was, once again, curiosity – to be precise, the kind 
of curiosity “which enables one to get free of oneself [se déprendre de soi-
même]” (1985, 8). But, how could curiosity do such a thing, and what does it 
mean to se déprendre de soi-même? In a way that is characteristic of his late 
work, this phrase indicates Foucault’s willingness to draw a strong connection 
between his own, let’s call it Nietzschean, critique and a long philosophical and 
even religious tradition of “spirituality”. In one of his late interviews, Foucault 
gives this tentative definition of spirituality: 
 
By spirituality, I understand...that which precisely refers to a subject 
acceding to a certain mode of being and to the transformations which 
the subject must make of himself in order to accede to this mode of 
being. (2000, 294) 
 
This understanding is close to that of Pierre Hadot (1981; 1995), who interprets 
ancient Greek and Roman philosophy as an elaboration of a series of “spiritual 
exercises” whose aim is to transform the self. Hence, we could say that the 
prisoners in Plato’s cave, for example, are faced with the task not so much of 
breaking their chains as breaking free of themselves. And they do this through a 
spiritual exercise that Hadot calls a “conversion” (1981, 175) and Plato calls a 
“turning around of the mind itself” (1982, 518d). In essence, then, the mission 
Socrates sets for himself is to goad and guide as many fellow Athenians as 
possible towards such a conversion.  
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Expanding from this core meaning, Foucault comes to see the idea of 
getting free of oneself, conceived as a spiritual exercise, as existing on a line 
that connects Socrates, the Stoics, the early Christian ascetics, the leaders of 
the Reformation, nineteenth century revolutionaries, and even (briefly) the 
Iranian revolution of 1979. In making this conception central to his idea of 
critique, he also situates contemporary critique as emerging out of a long and 
complicated history – one that doesn’t offer a model but may offer resources to 
us in the present. One of those resources, I would suggest, is this idea of 
getting free of oneself. So, once again, what does it mean to se déprendre de 
soi-même?  
 
First, it must be clear to any reader with even the most limited French 
that “getting free” couldn’t exactly be a literal translation of se déprendre de. But, 
the problem is that there is no single straightforward way to translate that verb 
into English — at least, if one wants to avoid a construction such as “to self-
untake oneself from oneself”. Translators of Foucault have chosen a range of 
ways to get around this: Hurley has “to get free of oneself” (Foucault, 1985, 8); 
Rabinow suggests “to disassemble the self” (Foucault, 1997a, xxxviii); Flynn 
suggests “think against oneself” (Flynn, 2005, 620). These are all perfectly fine 
translations, but really the possibilities are countless and might include: to break 
away from oneself; to be released from oneself; to get release from oneself; to 
shed one's skin; to be reborn; to see oneself anew; to see oneself in a new 
light; to divest oneself of oneself. Many of these phrases convey some of the 
sense of spirituality that Foucault wishes to tap into. And, it is not by chance that 
many of them are common ways to characterise experiences of profound 
(religious) conversion. The final example in this list is a rather striking phrase 
that occurs in an observer’s account of a Catholic martyr’s preparation for death. 
Oliver Plunkett, who was the Archbishop of Armagh at the time, was hanged, 
drawn and quartered in London in 1681; in his final days of imprisonment he is 
said to have “continually studied how to divest himself of himself, and become 
more and more an entire and perfect holocaust” (cited in Kilfeather, 2002, 229).  
 
 While these religious and spiritual resonances are clearly present, and 
while Foucault was not necessarily averse to playing with this range of 
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meanings, it is also possible to translate the phrase in ways that are more, for 
want of a better expression, secular. These might include: to extricate the self 
from itself; to get distance from oneself; to stop believing in oneself; to get out of 
your own clutches; to dissociate from oneself; to reject oneself; to unwind one’s 
position (yoga or finance?); to break the habits of the self. For the purposes of 
this paper, however, I would like to suggest a different, more vernacular 
possibility, as a way of defusing some of the spiritual aura around this concept. 
Thus, I will say that Foucault valued the kind of curiosity “which allows you to 
get over yourself”. Here, getting over yourself draws on the everyday sense of: 
letting go of my sense of self-importance; loosening the bonds that tie me to my 
so dearly-held beliefs; discarding the idea that my values, worldview, and 
perspective are of major significance simply because they are mine. What I will 
add to this everyday sense of the term is the idea that getting over yourself is a 
very difficult thing to do; it requires, as everybody in this philosophico-spiritual 
tradition will attest, a “patient labour” on the self (Foucault, 1984, 50). But what it 
brings to light are those points at which change is possible, what Foucault calls 
“transformable singularities” rather than “impassable boundaries” (1997a, 201). 
Putting this together with what has gone before, we can say that critique is an 
intellectual-experimental practice that makes it possible to re-experience our 
unthought modes of experience, in such a way that helps or cajoles us to ‘get 
over ourselves’, thus opening up the possibility of transformation.  
 
 Let’s revisit the plastic bag vignette one last time. If we were interested in 
undertaking a critique of our contemporary (ethical) experience in relation to the 
environment, there are several things we would need to do. First, investigate 
the forms of production, distribution, and contestation of knowledge relating to 
climate change. Second, explore the modes of regulation and coercion, in other 
words the governmentality, of behaviour in environmentally relevant domains. 
Third, give an account of the newly emerging pragmatics of self that inform 
ethical self-understandings and practices for a growing number of individuals. 
Such an investigation would count as critique insofar as it would both 
encourage and require a questioning, a distancing, and potentially a letting-go, 
of habitual (or even brand new) ethical conceptions and practices. The role of 
intellectual production in this whole process would be to facilitate a re-
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experiencing of those familiar modes of experience, for both researcher and 
reader; that is, a kind of experience squared. 
 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
 My aim here has been to set up a framework for the analysis of the 
historical dimensions of experience. This framework allows us to give an 
account of the ways in which individual, everyday experience is made possible 
by broader social and historical forces. In other words, it allows us to gauge the 
extent to which our experiences as individuals are not as private and unique as 
we might imagine. This historical analysis of experience also opens up a novel 
way of understanding the force of critique. On this account, critique is a kind of 
intellectual labour that makes available (to both researcher and reader) a de-
stabilising re-experiencing of the historical dimensions of our everyday 
experience. Critique is an experiential practice; that is, experience squared. In 
the field of ethics, more than in any other field, this demands a loosening of the 
bonds that tie us to our habitual modes of thought and action. This loosening is 
an essential step if we are to “get over ourselves”, in the sense of opening 
ourselves up to new modes of the pragmatics of self.  
 
 While the account given here sets up the framework for a critique of 
ethical experience, with particular reference to contemporary changes in moral 
sensibility in relation to the environment, it doesn’t actually carry out such a 
critique. But, it still may not be premature to ask what might emerge from such a 
critique in this domain. One way to begin to answer that question would be to 
point out that the theme of responsibility is central to this whole field of our 
contemporary moral experience. Along all three axes of experience, the 
problem of responsibility emerges. First, who is responsible for the climate 
change that is already observable in our planet? Is it really anthropogenic, and 
if so, which countries and which human behaviours are now the biggest 
contributors? Second, who is responsible for bringing about the kinds of 
changes that are necessary to slow down the rate of climate change? Private 
corporations, international bodies, national governments, only the developed 
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nations or the emerging economies also? Third, to what extent is the individual 
consumer responsible for the global impacts of their everyday behaviour? And, 
most importantly, what technologies of ‘responsibilisation’ are contributing to a 
changing pragmatics of the self in this domain? In all three domains, then, 
discourses and practices of responsibility are mobilised in ways that call for a 
critical problematisation. In the domain of ethics, however, this mobilisation can 
be expected to be more intimately bound up with ingrained habits of self-
relation. As a result, the task here would be to open up this newly emerging 
pragmatics of self for critical exploration. We cannot say, in advance, what 
would arise from such a critique, but on the basis of the argument presented 
here we can be sure that it would require, in some way and to some extent, that 
we all get over ourselves.  
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